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Abstract 
 
 
In an OLG model of a small open economy we analyse the characteristics of saving and fertility 
under two different public policies: i) constant per capita taxes (and endogenous public debt) and ii) 
constant per-capita debt (and endogenous stabilizing taxes). Our analysis highlights that a fertility 
recovery (reduction resp.) requires always a reduction (increase resp.) of taxes, although the 
implications for public debt management are not trivial, since they depend on the regime the 
economy is experiencing, i.e. on the relationship between the interest rate and the fertility rate in 
absence of taxes. 
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1 Introduction
In this paper we explore the behaviour of both saving and fertility in an OLG
model in the presence of two policies entailing public debt: i) constant per
capita taxes (and endogenous public debt) and ii) constant per-capita debt
(and endogenous-stabilizing taxes). Although such issues are not new in eco-
nomic research, in general they have been analysed separately.
In fact, several scholars have focused on the relationship between saving
and public debt with fixed population growth (Diamond (1965)) or between
fertility and income although disregarding the role of public policies (e.g.
Jones and Schoonbroodt (2010)). Conversely, other works focused on demo-
graphic issues with public debt but abstracting from the saving-fertility-wage
relationship (e.g., van Groezen et al. (2003), Fenge and von Weizsäcker (2010)
and Fanti and Gori (2012)).
As regards the fertility-wage relationship1, some theories of fertility pre-
dict an inverse relationship, both because under suitable circumstances in-
creasing wages lead to substitute quantity of children with their quality (Becker
(1960), Becker and Tomes (1976)) and because of the negative substitution
effect of (female) wages on fertility, due to the potential increase of female
participation (Mincer (1966)).
Also the process of economic development and in particular the so-called
Demographic Transition has been the object of intense research in recent
years. The economic reasons lying behind the transition from a positive to a
negative relationship between fertility and income (i.e. from the Malthusian
to Modern fertility behaviour)2 have been largely investigated. For instance,
a negative relation between fertility and income in the models (set up in an
overlapping generations context) of Becker et al. (1990), Tamura (1998), Lu-
cas (1998), and Galor and Weil (1998) occurs as individuals begin to trade off
quantity for quality. In Galor and Weil (1996) a demographic transition is
generated through a difference in the endowments of men and women and a
shift in comparative advantage. Becker and Barro (1988), in the context of
a model of intergenerational altruism, show that increased (Harrod-neutral)
technical progress brings upon a higher growth rate of consumption and a
lower rate of fertility3; Jones (2001), by developing an idea-based growth
model, introduces a third effect of increasing wages on fertility: the subsis-
tence consumption level effect. Galor and Weil (2000) argue that the positive
effect of technical progress on the return to education and the feedback effect
of higher education on technical progress bring upon a rapid decline in fertil-
1See Galor and Weil (1999) and Guinnane (2011)) for an overview of several different the-
ories of the demographic transition.
2See Galor and Weil (1999).
3See also Renström and Spataro (2015) in an endogenous growth model with human capi-
tal.
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ity accompanied by accelerated output growth4; Fanti and Gori (2007) focus
on the effects of the unionization of the economies as a cause of the emergence
of modern fertility behaviour in place of the Malthusian one.
Although producing relevant results, such works have somehow over-
looked the role of public policies5. Therefore, in this paper we propose an
explanation which can add to the established explanations so far emerged in
the literature, by including public policies. To do so, we abstract from general
equilibrium effects and economic growth, by assuming the case of a small
open economy with public intervention, where the only source of growth is
given by population6. In particular the public intervention may assume two
typical forms which are at the heart of the current economic ad political de-
bate in most Western countries and sometimes seem to characterize the pol-
icy proposals of left and right-wing Governments: raising/reducing taxes and
raising/reducing debt, respectively.
We believe that our attempt is relevant for at least two reasons. First,
for theoretical purposes (to the best of our knowledge the analysis of public
debt in a small open economy with endogenous saving and fertility behaviour
has not been carried out so far). Although based on simplistic assumptions,
our insight may help to better understand the forces at work on saving and
fertility in presence of public debt, which can extend to more complex models
with endogenous prices and/or growth.
Second, our work is potentially relevant for policy reasons, since the re-
cent financial crisis has raised concern about the viability of sustained growth
in presence of increasing levels of public debt. Therefore it is natural to ask
whether the occurred and/or soon expected sizable changes in the public debt
(sometimes in opposite directions because the latter has been increased for
facing the recent financial crisis in countries with previously low debt and
necessarily will be decreased in countries with an existing very large debt
(such as Italy)) may affect fertility behaviour.
The main finding of the present paper is that while in the absence of inter-
generational transfers the standard logarithmic OLG model would predict
either a positive relation between fertility behaviour, saving and wages or
even independence of fertility choices from wage (because with logarithmic
utility and time-cost of childrearing - as assumed in the present paper - there
4Jones and Schoonbroodt (2016) analyse the behaviour of fertility along the business cycle
and show that it is procyclical.
5In fact, there are a few exceptions. For example, Fanti and Spataro (2013) analyse the
relationship between public debt and fertility in an OLG model with fixed costs for raising
children and general equilibrium factor prices, and show that the latter relation can be am-
biguous. We depart from such a work by assuming that childbearing is a time cost in nature
and factor prices are fixed.
6By doing this we also abstract from the issue of debt sustainability. For an insight into this
topic, see, for example, Chalk (2000), Bräuninger (2005), Futagami et al. (2008), Yakita (2008).
For a textbook treatment of the sustainability of constant debt policies under endogenous
interest rates see De la Croix and Michel (2004), ch. 4.
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is an exact balance between income and substitution effects), when public
policies are introduced things may change dramatically.
More precisely, we show that while the increase of taxes is always detri-
mental for both fertility and saving, the effect of per-capita public debt de-
pends on the conditions of the economy. More precisely, an increase of per-
capita public debt is detrimental (beneficial resp.) for both fertility and saving
when the interest rate is greater (smaller) than the fertility rate in the ab-
sence of the public fiscal policy and this happens when i) the interest rate is
sufficiently high (low), ii) the childbearing cost is sufficiently high (low) and
iii) the preference for children is sufficiently low (high). Moreover, while an
increase of the wage rate is always positive for both fertility and saving under
a constant per-capita tax policy, it may exert a negative effect on the latter
variables under a constant per-capita public debt policy: more precisely, it is
beneficial when the interest rate is greater than the fertility rate in the ab-
sence of the public fiscal policy and can be detrimental in the opposite case.
The latter result may have far reaching policy implications when the political
debate on the effects of too low wages (and a their possible increase) is con-
sidered: in the case of rising wages the use of a tax policy (resp. a debt policy)
may exacerbate the dramatic fertility drop (resp. boost a fertility recovery) in
many Western countries.
The work is organized as follows: in section 2 we lay out the model and
in section 3 we characterize the steady state under the two different policies;
in section 4 we carry out comparative statics exercises by investigating the
effects of the main parameters of the model on the long run levels of fertility
and saving. Conclusions will end the paper.
2 The model
In this work we extend a standard OLG model (Diamond (1965)) in order to
entail endogenous fertility7. In doing this we focus on the case of a small
open economy, where both the interest rate r and the wage w are fixed. The
basic actors of this economy are (i) a Government which can affect the levels
of a lump sum taxation τ and public debt b and (ii) individuals that live for
three periods (childhood, young adulthood, and old-age). When agents be-
come active (young adult) they take their decisions about present and future
consumptions and procreation, thus giving rise to a new generation: gener-
ations overlap. The behaviour of the two types of actors will be described
separately.
7We adopt a standard method for endogeneizing fertility in OLG models, following, for
instance, Galor and Weil (1996), Strulik (1999, 2003).
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2.1 Government
We imagine that the government implements a redistributive policy between
generations by lump sum taxes. More precisely, following Diamond (1965),
we assume that at each date t the government issues a non-negative amount
Bt of national debt and finances it by partly rolling it over and partly by
levying taxes upon the young adults, so that the dynamic equation of debt is:
Bt+1 =R ·Bt−τt ·L t (1)
where R ≡ 1+ r (r being the interest rate), τt is a lump sum tax imposed on
the young adult of period t and L t is the number of workers in period t which
we assume equal to the number of agents born in the previous period, i.e.
Nt−1 = L t. Denoting by nt ≡ NtNt−1 =
L t+1
L t
, the dynamic equation of debt can be
expressed in per worker terms as
bt+1 ·nt =R ·bt−τt (2)
2.2 Individuals
As already mentioned, individuals live for three periods. In the first period
they do not take any decisions. In the second period young adults are en-
dowed with well-behaved preferences described by a utility function U . Such
a function is defined over consumption in the second and third period of life
(c1, c2) and on the number of children per adult (n)8, respectively, which are
given birth by young adults9. Moreover, in the second period, individuals re-
ceive a salary w for their labour services (exogenously supplied) and decide
how to split such an income over life-time consumption and on child-bearing.
More precisely, we assume that each child costs a fixed fraction, q, of wage
w.10 To formalize, let an agent i of the cohort born in period t−1 become
active in period t (being a young adult) and, in this period, she chooses her
lifetime consumption plan (c1i,t, c
2
i,t+1) and fertility (ni,t) according to the log-
linear utility function
U(c1i,t, c
2
i,t+1,ni,t)= log(c1i,t)+d · log(c2i,t+1)+ f · log(ni,t) (3)
8Since we imagine that every single young adult can have children, it follows that the
population will be stationary or increasing if n is equal or bigger than 1, respectively.
9Note that we assume individuals derive utility from the number of children they have, in
line with a vast literature (e.g. Eckstein and Wolpin (1984)). However, the demand of children
could be also motivated supposing individuals i) derive utility from the utility of their children
(e.g. Becker and Barro (1988)) or from the consumption of their children (e.g. Kohlberg (1976));
ii) aim at receiving old-age support from their children (e.g. Willis (1980)). The investigation
of the effects of these alternative motivations for having children may be the object of future
research.
10See for example Strulik (1999, 2003) and Boldrin and Jones (2002), who make the same
assumption on the cost function. This function captures the modern view of a time-cost of
childrearing in terms of forgone wages.
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where d ≡ 11+δ is the time discount factor for the utility of future consumption
(δ being the time discount rate) and f a parameter appreciating the number
of children per adult in the utility function. The budget constraint is
c1i,t+
c2i,t+1
R
+w · q ·ni,t =w−τt (4)
Maximization of (3) in respect of (4) gives the following behavioural relations
c1i,t =
w−τt
p
(5)
c2i,t+1 =
R ·d · (w−τt)
p
(6)
ni,t = f · (w−τt)p · q ·w (7)
where p≡ 1+d+ f . Defining saving as si ≡ c
2
i
R , by (6) we get
si,t = d · (w−τt)p (8)
Inspection of equations (5) to (8) reveals, as expected from the log-linear util-
ity function, that all variables are linear in (disposable) income.
In the rest of the paper, as far as individual choices are concerned, we fo-
cus on fertility (n) and saving (s); the model is closed by the dynamic equation
of per capita debt (2) so that we have
nt = f · (w−τt)p · q ·w (9a)
st = d · (w−τt)p (9b)
bt+1 ·nt =R ·bt−τt (9c)
Since all agents are assumed identical, any reference to the subscript i in the
fertility and saving functions is dropped from now on.
2.3 Solving for steady states: different policies
In a steady state all per capita variables, consumption levels (and saving),
fertility, taxes and debt burden are constant. Then system (9), in steady
state, becomes
τ= b · (R−n) (10a)
n= f · (w−τ)
p · q ·w (10b)
s= d · (w−τ)
p
(10c)
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Equation (10a) relates the values of the two public variables τ and b when the
system is in a steady state. Equations (10b) and (10c) represent individual
decisions and depend on the basic parameters of the model and on the level
of taxation τ.
Equations (10a)-(10c) form an interdependent system of three equations
with fuor variables (τ, b, n and s) and, as such, it is undetermined. To solve
it, we have to fix one variable and solve for the others: our choice is to focus on
public policies, thus fixing either τ or b, and then determine endogenously the
remaining variables. Given this framework, we can imagine two situations:
1. We fix τ and let eqs. (10a) and (10b) determine b and n; finally s is
obtained from eq. (10c) given τ. In this case the Government is com-
mitted to a given level of taxation and then b, n and s are determined
endogenously in system (10): we will call this the “constant lump sum
tax policy” case.
2. We fix b and let eqs (10a) and (10b) determine τ and n; s is obtained
once τ is determined. In this case, the Government is committed to
keep a given level of per capita debt and then τ, n and s are determined
endogenously in system (10): we will call this the “constant debt policy”
case.
In either case, a crucial role is played by the quantity b ·(R−n) (see eq. (10a))
that will also be one of the key elements in the analysis to follow; to interpret
it, notice that b is the present generation per capita debt “endowment” and
hence R ·b is the debt “bequest” left by each member of the current generation
to their children; on the other hand b ·n is the amount of debt that the next
generation should receive were each of the children to be endowed with the
same per capita debt of the parents. The imbalance between these two terms
is the debt left by the current generation to the next generation in excess of
what would be required to keep per capita debt constant (the difference R ·b−
n · b will be termed “excess debt” for short in what follows); in presence of a
non null excess debt and in absence of any intervention, per capita debt of the
new generation would differ from that of the parents. Therefore in a steady
state characterized by the invariance of per capita debt across generations,
this extra debt must be absorbed and the present generation must provide,
through taxation τ, the necessary resources to eliminate the imbalance, i.e.
τ = b · (R−n); in other words, τ is the cost that the present generation must
pay to guarantee the invariance of debt across generations.
Notice that when n = R the excess debt is null for whatever level of b
and indeed τ= 0, so that disposable income is maximized, i.e. n=R is a sort
of golden rule for intergenerational debt invariance and for this reason the
quantity R−n will be termed the “golden rule gap” in what follows.
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Solving for steady state with a constant lump sum tax policy: in this
case the Government fixes the desired level of taxation τ and then the inter-
play of public decisions (τ) and individual choices (n(τ)) determines the level
of public debt b(τ) thorough the equation b(τ)= τR−n(τ) (see eq. (10a)); the lat-
ter relation highlights that the equilibrium per capita debt is affected by τ in
two ways, directly and indirectly through the golden rule gap. Given the form
of the fertility and saving functions, once τ is given, n and s are determined.
Formally, we substitute n from eq. (10b) into eq. (10a) and solve for b; then
fertility and saving levels are determined by eqs. (10b) and (10c). Hence,
under this policy, system (10) has the following explicit solution
b(τ)= p · q ·w ·τ
R · p · q ·w− f · (w−τ) (11a)
n(τ)= f · (w−τ)
p · q ·w (11b)
s(τ)= d · (w−τ)
p
(11c)
Notice that here the exogenous variable is the level of taxation and public
debt adjusts to guarantee equilibrium.11
Solving for steady state with a debt stabilizing lump sum tax policy:
in this case the exogenous variable is b since Government is aimed at keeping
the burden of per capita debt constant across generations (as in Diamond
(1965); then taxes τ are calibrated in such a way that the interplay of τ and
individual choices on fertility n(τ) makes the target debt b sustainable in
steady state. Indeed, this value of τ comes from the solution for τ of the
equation τ= b·(R−n(τ)) which highlights the twofold role played by taxes also
in this case: on the one hand, they determine fertility and hence contribute
to determine the golden rule gap and the excess debt; on the other hand,
they serve just the purpose to cover the so generated excess debt. Once τ is
determined, decisions about saving are determined as well.
To have an explicit solution in this case, it is sufficient to substitute n from
eq. (10b) into eq. (10a) and solve for τ; we then substitute the so obtained
value of the tax into eq. (10b) and eq. (10c), thus obtaining the following
11We are aware that, in this setting, with given taxes and debt evolving according to eq.
(9c), there may be problems as to the dynamics of debt. Debt dynamics as from eq. (9c) is
unstable whenever R > nt, diverging from the steady states of system (11) as a consequence
of whatever shock. The choice here is to focus on the characteristics of equilibrium positions
compatible with given taxation levels, irrespective of the ability of the economy to recover any
of them. In principle we could justify this by assuming that at any moment Government could
tailor the amount of debt to its equilibrium value by suitable debt consolidation or expansion.
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explicit solution for system (10):
τ(b)= b ·w · (R · p · q− f )
p · q ·w−b · f (12a)
n(b)= f · (w−R ·b)
p · q ·w−b · f (12b)
s(b)= d · q ·w · (w−R ·b)
p · q ·w−b · f (12c)
Notice that here the exogenous variable is the per capita level of debt and
taxation adjusts to guarantee equilibrium.
3 Characterization of steady states
To characterize the steady states for this economy, we assume that all exoge-
nous economic parameters of the model are positive, i.e.
A1) w> 0, R > 0, q> 0
and preferences are well defined and monotone
A2) d > 0 and f > 0
Moreover we restrict attention to the economically more compelling case in
which all model variables are non-negative; therefore, in the case of a con-
stant tax policy, we impose the restriction
R1) τ≥ 0 and n(τ)≥ 0, s(τ)≥ 0, b(τ)≥ 0
while, in the case of a debt stabilizing tax policy, we impose the restriction
R2) b≥ 0 and n(b)≥ 0, s(b)≥ 0, τ(b)≥ 0
Clearly the respect of conditions R1) in the case of a constant tax policy or
R2) in the case of a debt stabilizing tax policy imposes restrictions on the
values that parameters can take in steady state and on the relation among
them; this is shown in the following Proposition where a crucial role is played
by the relation between R and the quantity fp·q , i.e. the value of fertility in
absence of taxation12 (the proof is in the Appendix A).
Proposition 1. Suppose A1) and A2) hold.
a) Assume R > fp·q ; then
i. (b(τ),n(τ), s(τ)) satisfy R1) iff 0≤ τ≤w; in this case 0≤ b(τ)≤ wR .
ii. (τ(b),n(b), s(b)) satisfy R2) iff 0≤ b≤ wR ; in this case 0≤ τ(b)≤w.
12Indeed by eq. (7) or eq. (10b) we have n(τ)= f ·(w−τ)p·q·w and hence it is n(0)=
f
p·q .
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b) Assume R = fp·q ; then
i. (b(τ),n(τ), s(τ)) satisfy R1) iff 0 ≤ τ ≤ w; in this case b(τ) = wR for
any τ ∈ [0,w].
ii. (τ(b),n(b), s(b)) satisfy R2) iff b ≥ 0; in this case τ(b) = 0 for any
b≥ 0.
c) Assume R < fp·q ; then
i. (b(τ),n(τ), s(τ)) satisfy R1) iff 0 < τ ≡ ( f−R·p·q)·wf ≤ τ ≤ w; in this
case b(τ)≥ wR .
ii. (τ(b),n(b), s(b)) satisfyR2) iff b≥ wR ; in this case 0< τ≡ ( f−R·p·q)·wf ≤
τ(b)≤w.
By the previous Proposition, we can distinguish two regimes separated
by the peculiar case in which R = fp·q : the former, identified by the condi-
tion R > fp·q (see point a) in Proposition 1), in which population in absence
of taxation would grow at a rate that is slower than the interest rate (this
will be termed the “low population growth” regime) and the latter, identified
by the condition R < fp·q (see point c) in Proposition 1), in which population
in absence of taxation would grow at a rate that is faster than the inter-
est rate (this will be termed the “fast population growth” regime). In the
first regime, a steady state with non-negative values of all variables occurs
for any τ such that 0 ≤ τ ≤ w, but is compatible only with moderate level of
public debt (b ≤ wR ). In the other regime, a steady state with non-negative
values of all variables is achievable only with a huge public debt (b > wR ) and
strictly positive taxes (w ≥ τ ≥ ( f−R·p·q)·wf ≡ τ > 0). The regime separating
case (R = fp·q , see point b) in Proposition 1), is characterized alternatively by
the irrelevance of a tax policy as to the management of per capita debt (only
private variables n and s are affected) or the irrelevance of a debt manage-
ment policy as to the determination of any other variable in the model (indeed
steady state values of τ, n and s are given and independent of b in this case).
By these findings, the case R = fp·q 13 configures as an exceptional case which
is rather uninteresting for the purposes of the present analysis and hence it
will be neglected in what follows.
Beside these restrictions, steady states of this economy can be further
characterized; a first consequence of Proposition 1 concerns the extent by
which population is allowed to grow in steady state when all the assumptions
and restrictions imposed so far are satisfied. In particular we can show that
(the proof is in the Appendix A)
13Notice that this is exactly the steady state value of fertility when R = fp·q and the Gov-
ernment aims at stabilizing per capita debt since in this case τ(b)= 0 ∀b ≥ 0 (see Proposition
1b)).
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Corollary 1. Under A1) and A2), in any steady state satisfying R1) or R2)
it is
n(x)≤R x ∈ {τ,b}
Therefore any steady state satisfying R1) or R2), i.e. characterized by the
simultaneous presence of non negative debt and non negative taxes, is bound
to have a non negative golden rule gap and a non negative excess debt.
Furthermore it is easy to see that, for any given configuration of parame-
ters respecting A1) and A2), the solutions τ(b) and b(τ) satisfying R1) or R2)
in either regime are such that τ= τ(b(τ)) and b= b(τ(b)), i.e. the equilibrium
results of the two policies are strictly interconnected, since the two functions
τ(b) and b(τ) are one just the inverse of the other.
3.1 Regimes and the different effects of public policies
The results of the previous Section highlight that R1) and R2) impose restric-
tions on viable steady state policies and, within those bounds, the system is
characterized by a persistent golden rule gap and excess debt; moreover, by
Proposition 1, different population growth regimes imply different levels of
debt. Indeed, we now show that the different regimes affect also the mag-
nitude of the golden rule gap and the intensity of its reaction to changes in
policy. More precisely, denoting by ητ(R−n(τ))= τR−n(τ) · ∂(R−n(τ))∂τ the elasticity
of the golden rule gap to τ, we have:
Lemma 1. Suppose A1) - A2) are satisfied; then
R−n(τ)≷ R ·τ
w
⇔ R≷ f
p · q
ητ (R−n(τ))≶ 1 ⇔ R≷ fp · q
In words, if the economy is in a slow (fast resp.) population growth regime,
the golden rule gap (i) is bounded from below (above resp.) by the quantity
R·τ
w and (ii) is inelastic (elastic resp.) with respect to changes in taxation. To
exemplify: suppose that preference parameters, cost of rearing children and
wages are given; then the two regimes are uniquely identified by the interest
factor assuming a value R > fp·q when the system is in a “slow population
growth” regime and a value R′ < fp·q when the system is in a “fast population
growth” regime. With taxes at a given level τ, fertility is the same in either
regime, n(τ)= f ·(w−τ)p·q·w , but the golden rule gap is higher in the “slow” than in
the “fast” population growth regime, since, by the first inequalities in Lemma
1, we have
R−n(τ)> R ·τ
w
> f
p · q ·
τ
w
> R
′ ·τ
w
>R′−n(τ)
Suppose now that, for some reason, taxes are to be reduced to a level τ′ < τ. In
both regimes fertility will take an identical new value n(τ′) = f ·(w−τ′)p·q·w > n(τ)
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with an identical variation ∆n = n(τ′)− n(τ) and hence the golden rule gap
will reduce by the same amount in both regimes. However the percentage
reduction of the golden rule gap is lower in the “slow” than in the “fast” pop-
ulation growth regime simply because its original value was greater in the
first than in the second regime. Therefore, the sensitivity of the golden rule
gap to identical variations in the tax level is different in the two regimes, as
stated in the Lemma.
On the basis of this result, we can now show that the ruling regime affects
also the way in which the two public variables τ and b are correlated; in
particular we show that increasing debts must be sustained by increasing
taxes in a “slow population growth” regime, while decreasing taxes lead to
an increase of debt in the other regime. This is the content of the following
Proposition:
Proposition 2. Suppose A1) and A2) hold true:
• Under a constant tax policy, the steady state solution b(τ) satisfying R1)
is such that db(τ)dτ ≷ 0⇔R≷ fp·q .
• Under a debt stabilizing policy, the steady state solution τ(b) satisfying
R2) is such that dτ(b)db ≷ 0⇔ b≶ wR ⇔R≷ fp·q .
The formal proof of Proposition 2 is in the Appendix A, but we can give
here a simple intuition, focusing for simplicity on just the first case (constant
tax policy) in which b(τ)= τR−n(τ) : then the overall change in per capita debt
due to a change in taxation is given by
∂b(τ)
∂τ
=
∂
(
τ
R−n(τ)
)
∂τ
= (R−n(τ))−τ ·
∂(R−n(τ))
∂τ
(R−n(τ))2 =
1
R−n(τ) ·
(
1−ητ (R−n(τ))
)
Apart from the term 1R−n(τ) which is always non negative by Corollary 1, the
sign of the effect of a change in taxation on the level of debt is due to the
balance of the terms in
(
1−ητ(R−n(τ))
)
: the term “1” measures the direct
effect on debt of a change in taxes “at constant fertility” as expressed by the
numerator in τR−n(τ) ; the other term (ητ(R− n(τ))) measures the indirect ef-
fect on debt of a change in taxation due to the fact that, all other things
constant, taxation affects also fertility as expressed by the denominator in
τ
R−n(τ) . Since, by Lemma 1, this second term is greater or lower than 1 de-
pending on the population growth regime, it follows that the reaction of debt
to taxation is qualitatively different in the two regimes.
The results obtained so far receive a simple graphical representation in
the following diagram in which the steady state relations between τ and b in
the two regimes are presented: “slow population growth” in Figure 1(A) and
“fast population growth” in Figure 1(B).14
14In this Figure the values of the parameters are: w = 3.5, τ = 1.2, q = 0.25, d = 23 , f = 1.
With these values fp·q = 1.5 and we set R = 1.65 in Figure 1(A) and R′ = 1.35 in Figure 1(B).
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(A) Slow population growth regime
(
R > fp·q
)
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(
R′ < fp·q
)
Figure 1: Characterization of steady state policies in the two different regimes.
The shadowed regions in each picture represent the bounds on public
variables imposed by the restrictions R1) and R2) in the respective regime
(see Proposition 1). The curves b(τ) and b′(τ) represent the equilibrium re-
lations between the two public variables in the two regimes, i.e. the equilib-
rium level of debt corresponding to a taxation level τ; according to Proposi-
tion 2, the locus of (τ−b) equilibrium combinations is positively sloped in the
“slow population growth regime” and negatively sloped in the “fast population
growth regime”, i.e. a change in either policy instrument in the first regime is
accompanied by a change of the same sign in the other public variable, while
the second regime entails changes of opposite sign.
3.1.1 Public policies, fertility, saving and population growth regimes
The behavioural relations in eqs. (10b) and (10c) show that there is a negative
effect of taxation on both fertility and saving; given the form of the assumed
utility function, n and s are normal in disposable income so that any increase
(reduction resp.) in taxation, lowering (increasing resp.) disposable income,
produces a reduction (increase resp.) of fertility and saving. Therefore, when
public authorities are interested to a stable taxation and, by some reason,
have to change the target level, the effects of this change on private decisions
n and s are well determined and qualitatively identical across regimes: an
increase in taxation always leads to a reduction of fertility and saving.
On the contrary, when public authorities are committed to stabilize the
per capita debt and, for some reason, they have to change its level, the effects
on private decisions depend on the regime the economy is in. This different
effects can be appreciated in the following Figures 2(A) and 2(B), in which
the picture on the left represents the equilibrium relation between public
variables, the second picture represents the fertility function n(τ) = f ·(w−τ)p·q·w
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drawn as a function of τ on the vertical axis and the picture on the right
represents the saving function s(τ) = d·(w−τ)p again drawn as a function of τ.
Figure 2(A) represents the situation arising in the “slow population growth”
regime following a decision by public authorities to increase the amount of
per capita debt (from b to b′).
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(a) - Public variables (b) - Fertility (c) - Saving
Figure 2(A): Effects of a per capita debt increase on taxes, fertility and saving in a “slow pop-
ulation growth regime”
In this case equilibrium values of policy variables are positively correlated
so that an increase of the amount of per capita debt induces an increase of
taxes which reflects in a reduction of fertility and of saving decisions.
In the other regime (“fast population growth”), the situation is portrayed
in Figure 2(B). Contrary to the previous case, now equilibrium values of
public variables are negatively correlated so that an increase of the amount
of per capita debt from b to b′ induces a reduction of taxation which reflects
in an increase of fertility and of saving decisions.
Therefore a same debt expansion has opposite effects on private decisions,
depending on the ruling regime and this is finally due to the different ways in
which taxes must be calibrated to keep equilibrium in the two cases. Clearly,
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Figure 2(B): Effects of a per capita debt increase on taxes, fertility and saving in a “fast popu-
lation growth regime”
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these effects could also be interpreted the other way round; suppose that
public authorities are interested in stimulating fertility and saving. Given
behavioural relations (10b) and (10c), this stimulation can be obtained by
a reduction of taxes, i.e. increasing disposable income. Given the form of
the equilibrium relation as in Figure 1, the required reduction of taxation
must be accomplished through a reduction of per capita debt in the “slow
population growth” regime, while in the other regime this can be obtained at
the cost of an increase in the per capita debt level.
4 Comparative statics on the steady state solutions
In this Section we extend the previous analysis and, fixed a policy in terms
of either taxes or per capita debt, we analyze the effects on the other public
variable and individual decisions of a change in underlying parameters of the
model (w, R, q) through comparative static exercises. As it can be expected,
results are not identical under the two regimes. Throughout this Section we
assume A1) and A2) and that the system satisfies R1) or R2).
4.1 Changes of wage w
The following table summarizes the results for changes in wage w; they are
obtained by simple differentiation of the steady state relations in systems
(11) and (12) with respect to w (the proofs are in the Appendix C):
Constant tax policy Debt stabilizing policy
Public debt Individual choices Taxation Individual choices
R > fp·q ∂b(τ)∂w > 0 ∂n(τ)∂w > 0 ∂s(τ)∂w > 0 ∂τ(b)∂w < 0 ∂n(b)∂w > 0 ∂s(b)∂w > 0
R < fp·q ∂b(τ)∂w > 0 ∂n(τ)∂w > 0 ∂s(τ)∂w > 0 ∂τ(b)∂w > 0 ∂n(b)∂w < 0 ∂s(b)∂w Q 0 15
As we can see, within a same regime, a change of w produces different
effects depending on the policy target public authorities are committed to. To
analyze these diverging implications, we focus on each regime separately, but
preliminarily notice that there is a common effect at work in both regimes:
all other things constant, an increase of wage increases disposable income
and hence, for a same level of taxation, all curves as in Figures 2(A) and 2(B)
move to the right. More precisely, given τ, an increase of w (a) stimulates
fertility16 (b) increases saving due to the increase of disposable income (and
15Indeed ∂s(b)
∂w ≤ 0 for b ∈
[
w
R ,
w
R ·
(
1+
√
R· f
p·q −1
)]
and ∂s(b)
∂w > 0 for b> wR ·
(
1+
√
R· f
p·q −1
)
(see
Appendix C).
16The fact that higher wages promote higher fertility may appear surprising since w is both
the individual wage and a determinant of the cost of having children (q ·w); hence an increase
in w entails both a positive income effect and a negative substitution effect. As shown in the
Appendix B, the two effects cancel out in absence of taxation, but the income effect prevails if
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to the fact that, given the assumed form of the utility function, future con-
sumption is normal in disposable income) and finally (c) produces an increase
of the equilibrium per capita debt corresponding to that level of taxation; this
latter effect is due to the fact that an increase of wages increases fertility and
this reduces the golden rule gap, i.e. the excess debt, thus making an higher
value of debt sustainable in equilibrium with unchanged taxes.
4.1.1 Changes of w in the “slow population growth” regime
The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of w can be
summarized in the following Figure in which we assume that model param-
eters are such that R > fp·q i.e. the economy is within the “slow population
growth” regime. As outlined previously, all curves shift to the right due to the
increase of wage:
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Figure 3(A): The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of wages in the
“slow population growth” regime
Constant tax policy: if public authorities are committed to keep a con-
stant level of τ, we can see that the system passes from the original equi-
librium configuration as represented by the points labeled as E to the new
equilibrium configuration as represented by the points labeled as E′τ, i.e. we
observe an increase of equilibrium per capita debt from b to b′, an increase in
the value of n passing from n(τ) to n′(τ) and finally an increase of the amount
of saving passing from s(τ) to s′(τ).
Debt stabilizing policy: suppose now that public authorities were com-
mitted to keep per capita debt stable at the original level b. To do that they
have to suitably tailor taxation and, looking at the first picture in Figure 3(A),
this is accomplished by a reduction of taxes from the original level τ to the
new level τ′; this is possible since the excess debt is now decreased (due to the
augmented fertility) and can be matched by a parallel reduction of τ since in
τ> 0, as in the cases we examine.
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this regime the golden rule gap is relatively inelastic to τ itself. This reduc-
tion of taxation reinforces the increase in disposable income already produced
by the increase of wages and consequently we have further stimulus to pri-
vate fertility and saving decisions, passing from n(τ) to n′(τ′) and from s(τ) to
s′(τ′) respectively.
4.1.2 Changes of w in the “fast population growth” regime
In this case, determined by a configuration of parameters such that R < fp·q ,
the effects of an increase of wage can be summarized as in the following Fig-
ure 3(B), where for the same reasons previously outlined, all the curves shift
to the right:
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Figure 3(B): The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of wages in the
“fast population growth” regime.
Constant tax policy: if public authorities are committed to a constant
level of τ, the situation is the same as the one described in Section 4.1.1.
Keeping taxes constant, the increase of wages translates in an increase of
disposable income that stimulates fertility from n(τ) to n′(τ) and saving from
s(τ) to s′(τ); the reduced golden rule gap (R−n′(τ)<R−n(τ) since n′(τ)> n(τ))
allows to sustain a larger per capita debt, that indeed passes from b to b′.
Debt stabilizing policy: under this policy, public authorities want to keep
debt at level b in face of a reduction of the golden rule gap (due to the aug-
mented fertility). However in this regime, as seen in Proposition 2, the golden
rule gap is elastic to τ and a decrease of taxation would reduce so much the
value of the golden rule gap that the overall effect on debt (b= τR−n(τ) ) would
be actually an increase of b. The impossibility of matching the reduced excess
debt with a reduction of taxes, makes a tax increase the only instrument to
restore equilibrium as can be seen in Figure 3(B), where the new equilibrium
with constant debt, following a wage increase, occurs in position E′b with an
increase in taxation from τ to τ′. As a consequence, we observe an increase
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of both wages and taxation and the effect on private variables n and s will
depend on the balance between these two variations, resulting either in an
increase or in a reduction of disposable income. Actually Figure 3(B) repre-
sents the case in which the two variations balance in a reduction of disposable
income and hence both fertility and saving contract to the new values n′(τ′)
and s′(τ′).
However, in this regime, a particular situation may occur when debt is
very high (and taxes are very low): in this case, the increase of w produces an
increase in τ that is so small that increments in wages and taxes balance in
an increase of net disposable income, making saving to increase (this effect
is not appreciated in fertility decisions since there is also an increase in the
cost of bearing children (q·w) outweighing the increase in disposable income).
This special situation is portrayed in the following Figure:
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Figure 3(C): The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of wages in the
“fast population growth” regime with very high debt
4.2 Changes of the interest factor R
The interest rate is one of the determinants of the regime the economy is in;
therefore we have to distinguish two cases: changes of R keeping the economy
within the same regime and changes of R producing a regime switch. They
will be analyzed separately.
4.2.1 Intra-regime changes of the interest factor R
In this case we assume that the change of the interest factor R does not alter
the ruling regime determined by the quantity fp·q . The following table sum-
marizes the results obtained by differentiation of the steady state relations
in systems (11) and (12) with respect to R (the proofs are in the Appendix C).
As usual, the effects on model variables due to a change of R vary depend-
ing on the regime and the policy adopted and will be analyzed separately.
However, as in the previous case, the effect of an increase of R on the shape
17
Constant tax policy Debt stabilizing policy
Public debt Individual choices Taxation Individual choices
R > fp·q ∂b(τ)∂R < 0 ∂n(τ)∂R = 0 ∂s(τ)∂R = 0 ∂τ(b)∂R > 0 ∂n(b)∂R < 0 ∂s(b)∂R < 0
R < fp·q ∂b(τ)∂R < 0 ∂n(τ)∂R = 0 ∂s(τ)∂R = 0 ∂τ(b)∂R < 0 ∂n(b)∂R > 0 ∂s(b)∂R > 0
of the curves b(τ), n(τ) and s(τ) is qualitatively identical in the two regimes:
indeed simply looking at equations (10b) and (10c) we see that fertility and
saving decisions are independent of R so the respective curves will not be af-
fected by any change of the interest rate. As far as the equilibrium relation
between τ and b is concerned, we observe that, all other things constant, an
increase of R increases excess debt. For any given taxation level, this higher
cost can be sustained only by lowering the amount of per capita debt (remem-
ber the equilibrium relation τ = b · (R − n)); therefore for any given level of
τ, as a consequence of an increase of R we have a reduction of b, i.e. the
equilibrium loci for public variables must move to the left.
4.2.1.1 Changes of R in the “slow population growth” regime
The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of the inter-
est factor from R to R′ (R > fp·q ) can be summarized in the following Figure.
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Figure 4(A): The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of R in the
“slow population growth” regime.
Constant tax policy: in this case, the consequences of keeping taxes con-
stant at level τ when R increases as in Figure 4(A) are simple: disposable
income does not vary if τ is kept constant and R does not affect private deci-
sions, so that fertility and saving remain at their original level (n(τ) = n′(τ)
and s(τ)= s′(τ)). The only effect is on the equilibrium value of debt which, for
the reasons seen in Section 4.2.1, must decrease to level b′.
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Debt stabilizing policy: in the “slow population growth” regime the in-
creased excess debt can be covered by an increase in taxation, because this
latter will not affect substantially the golden rule gap that is now inelastic to
τ. Therefore the new equilibrium (E′b in Figure 4(A)) will be characterized by
a higher taxation level (τ′) than the original one. The consequent reduction
of disposable income will produce a contraction of both fertility (from n(τ) to
n′(τ′)< n(τ)) and saving (from s(τ) to s′(τ′)< s(τ)).
4.2.1.2 Changes of R in the “fast population growth” regime
The effects of and increase of the interest factor from R to R′ in a “fast popu-
lation growth” regime (R′ < fp·q ) are summarized in the following Figure
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Figure 4(B): The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of R in the “fast
population growth” regime.
Constant tax policy: under this policy disposable income does not vary
and since R does not affect private decisions, we have that fertility and sav-
ing remain at their original level (n(τ)= n′(τ) and s(τ)= s′(τ)). The only effect
is on the equilibrium value of debt which decreases to level b′, since the equi-
librium loci of public variables move to the left as explained in Section 4.2.1.
Debt stabilizing policy: keeping per capita debt constant in face of the ex-
tra debt induced by a higher value of R requires an adjustment in taxation.
In the “fast population growth” regime, this extra debt cannot be covered by
an increase of taxation, because now the golden rule gap is elastic to τ and an
increment of the latter would produce a so huge increase of the former that
they would balance in a reduction of debt rather than its constancy. Therefore
invariance of debt can be obtained just by a reduction of taxation stimulating
fertility and hence the reduction of the golden rule gap, so that the new equi-
librium (E′b in Figure 4(B)) will be characterized by a lower taxation level
(τ′). The consequent increase of disposable income will produce an expansion
of fertility (from n(τ) to n′(τ′)> n(τ)) and saving (from s(τ) to s′(τ′)> s(τ)).
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4.2.2 Regime switching changes of the interest rate R
When R varies crossing the value fp·q , we have a switch of regime passing
from “slow” to “fast” population growth or vice versa. For the sake of exposi-
tion, suppose that R decreases substantially and passes from taking the value
R (“slow population growth”) to a value R′ characterizing a “fast population
growth” regime (all the other parameters being as in Figure 1). The situation
is represented in the following picture (where R = 1.65 and R′ = 1.325):
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Figure 5: Public policies and regime switching due to a change of R.
As we can see, such a huge change in the interest rate brings the economy
from a regime in which the relation between public variables is increasing
and the system is bounded from above and right as described in Proposition
1a) (this is the region of the plane to the left of the dashed line wR ) to a regime
in which the public variables are correlated in a completely different way and
the system is bounded from below, above and left (see Proposition 1c)). The
main conclusions that can be drawn in presence of a change of R producing
a regime switch are the following and can be easily verified by appelling to
Proposition 1:
• No constant debt policy is tenable across regimes (the viable supports
for b in the two regimes are disjoint: see Proposition 1a)i. and 1c)i.);
• Only a constant tax policy can be held across regimes provided τ is
sufficiently high τ> τ= ( f−R′·p·q)·wf (only these values of τ are in the in-
tersection of the viable supports for this policy in the two regimes, see
Proposition 1a)ii. and 1c)ii.). If this type of policy is adopted by the Gov-
ernment, the effects on endogenous variables of the regime switching
change in R are the same examined in Section 4.2.1 for the constant
tax policy case: disposable income is not affected and hence fertility
and saving choices do not vary; on the other hand per capita equilib-
rium level of debt moves contrariwise to the change of R, due to the
fact that, other things constant, a reduction (increase resp.) of R re-
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duces (increases resp.) the excess debt and this is compatible with a
greater (lower resp.) amount of debt if taxes remain constant.
4.3 Changes of the child rearing cost q
Changes in q affect the other model variables in a twofold manner: on one
hand it affects directly individual decisions (specifically fertility) being one of
the determinants of the child bearing cost (q ·w), on the other it contributes
to the determination of the regime the economy is in (regimes depend on
whether R ≷ fp·q ). Both influences will be examined in the following, sepa-
rating the analysis of the intra-regime changes of q from the analysis of vari-
ations in q producing a regime switch. Given similarities with other cases
previously encountered, description will be shortened.
4.3.1 Intra-regime changes of the child rearing cost q
In this case, the change of the child rearing cost from an original value
q to a new value q′ is such that it does not cause any regime shift, i.e.
R > max
(
f
p·q ,
f
p·q′
)
or R < min
(
f
p·q ,
f
p·q′
)
, given R, f and p. With this re-
striction, the effects of the change of q differ across regimes and policies and
the following table summarizes the results, again obtained by differentiation
of the steady state relations in systems (11) and (12) with respect to q (the
proofs are in the Appendix C):
Constant tax policy Debt stabilizing policy
Public debt Individual choices Taxation Individual choices
R > fp·q ∂b(τ)∂q < 0 ∂n(τ)∂q < 0 ∂s(τ)∂q = 0 ∂τ(b)∂q > 0 ∂n(b)∂q < 0 ∂s(b)∂q < 0
R < fp·q ∂b(τ)∂q < 0 ∂n(τ)∂q < 0 ∂s(τ)∂q = 0 ∂τ(b)∂q < 0 ∂n(b)∂q > 0 ∂s(b)∂q > 0
As in the previous cases, we start noticing that the effect of an increase
of q on the shape of the curves b(τ), n(τ) and s(τ) is qualitatively identical
across regimes: a change of q affects fertility since it is a component of the
child bearing cost (q ·w): given the assumed form of the utility function, all
other parameters remaining constant, an increase of q reduces n, i.e. the
fertility function as represented in the middle pictures of Figures 2(A) and
2(B) moves to the left. This reduction in fertility, in turn, increases the golden
rule gap so that, for any given taxation level, there will be a higher excess
debt that can be eliminated just by lowering the amount of per capita debt,
i.e. the equilibrium locus for public variables must move to the left, as it can
be seen in the following Figures 6(A) and 6(B). Finally, observe that saving
is not affected by q (see eq. (10c)) so that there will not be any shift in the
respective function.
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4.3.1.1 Changes of q in the “slow population growth” regime
The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of the child
bearing cost from q to q′, when R > max
(
f
p·q ,
f
p·q′
)
, are summarized in the
following Figure.
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Figure 6(A): The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of q in the “slow
population growth” regime.
Constant tax policy: if public authorities keep taxes constant, disposable
income does not vary and hence we do not observe any modifications in sav-
ing decisions (s(τ) = s′(τ) in the third picture), but fertility reduces since we
have an increase in the cost of child bearing (n(τ) < n′(τ) in the second pic-
ture). As explained before, this reduced fertility increase the golden rule gap
and the excess debt of the present generation: this in turn, in the lack of
an adjustment on taxation, is bound to reduce the per capita debt that can
be sustained in equilibrium and indeed the equilibrium value of debt which
shrinks to b′ in the first picture of Figure 6(A).
Debt stabilizing policy: public authorities are now committed to keep
debt constant in face of an increase of the golden rule gap due to the decreased
fertility. As seen in Section 4.2.1.1, this calls for an increase in taxation, fur-
ther depressing fertility (and saving as well) due to the consequent reduction
of disposable income (see variations from n(τ) to n′(τ′)< n(τ) and from s(τ) to
s′(τ′)< s(τ) in Figure 6(A)).
4.3.1.2 Changes of q in the “fast population growth” regime
The effects of an increase of the child bearing cost from q to q′ such that
R <min
(
f
p·q ,
f
p·q′
)
are summarized in the following Figure.
Constant tax policy: in so far as this policy is concerned, the effects and
the mechanisms at work following an increase of q are identical to those
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Figure 6(B): The effects on public variables, fertility and saving of an increase of q in the “fast
population growth” regime.
analyzed in the previous section under the same policy and we observe a
reduction of fertility and equilibrium per capita debt (from n(τ) to n′(τ′)< n(τ)
and from b to b′ respectively) essentially due to the shift to the left of both
the equilibrium locus of public variables and of the fertility function, while
saving decisions remain unaffected.
Debt stabilizing policy: stabilizing debt at the original level b after the
increase in q that reduced fertility, requires now a reduction of taxation to
eliminate the generated extra debt since, in this way, fertility is stimulated
and the golden rule gap reduces. Therefore, due to the decreased taxation
(from τ to τ′), we have an increase in disposable income that increases saving
(from s(τ) to s′(τ′)> s(τ) in Figure 6(B)) and that more than compensates the
increased cost of child bearing due to the increase in q, so that finally we have
the desired increase in fertility (from n(τ) to n′(τ′)> n(τ)).
4.3.2 Regime switching changes of child rearing cost q
When the change of q produces a change of regime we are in a situation
similar to that examined in Section 4.2.2 and is represented in the following
Figure 7 where the increase of the child bearing cost from q to q′ makes the
system pass from the region to the right of the dashed line corresponding to
w
R (the “fast population growth” regime where R < fp·q ) to the region to the
left (the “slow population growth” regime where R > fp·q′ ):
Apart the shrinking of the separating region between the two regimes,
the situation is at all similar to that presented in Figure 5 in Section 4.2.2
and also the conclusions that can be drawn, so that they will not be repeated
here.
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Figure 7: Public policies and regime switching due to a change of q.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the behaviour of fertility and saving in an
OLG model of a small open economy in presence of intergenerational distri-
bution policies. We found that, in steady state positions, the public variables
(i.e. taxation and public debt levels) have a different correlation depending
on the parameters of the model defining two different possible regimes: slow
and fast population growth. Public policies affect other endogenous variables
such as consumption levels, saving and fertility and the calibration of pol-
icy instruments to (dis)incentivate them must be contingent on the ruling
regime. In particular, our analysis highlights that a fertility recovery (reduc-
tion resp.) requires always a reduction (increase resp.) of taxes, although the
implications for public debt management are not trivial, since they depend
on the regime the economy is experiencing, i.e. on the relationship between
the interest rate and the fertility rate in absence of taxes.
When the underlying parameters change, also the steady state values of
the endogenous variables change and the two policies have different effects:
these effects can be summarized in the following table where we report by
row regimes and the variables whose value changes to allow for comparative
statics and by column the endogenous variables under the different policies.
Constant tax policy Constant debt policy
b n s τ n s
Sl
ow
po
p-
ul
at
io
n
gr
ow
th
w + + + - + ±
R - 0 0 + - -
q - - 0 + - -
Fa
st
po
p-
ul
at
io
n
gr
ow
th
w + + + + - -
R - 0 0 - + +
q - - 0 - + +
24
To the extent that most Western countries, especially Italy, are currently
facing decreasing fertility and saving and increasing debt, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, extremely low interest rates, some policy implications
may be derived. Since a possible increase of such low interest rates could be
expected, an interesting prediction of the model is that public debt would be
reduced regardless of the regime types, under constant tax policy. By con-
trast, the effects on fertility and saving would depend crucially on the regime
types. Of course, it is an empirical matter whether it is possible in practice to
design a sufficiently well-targeted constant tax or debt policy. Moreover, we
note that the paper’s findings are only preliminary because we have chosen
indeed a very simple neoclassical model. For example, we have not considered
i) the endogeneity of factor prices, ii) alternative approaches to the demand
for children and/or the cost of children, iii) the relationship between growth
and mortality. Extensions in these directions, however, are left for further
research.
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Appendices
A Proofs of propositions in Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. The parts are proved separately. The general idea is
the following: to show that (x, f1(x), f2(x), f3(x)) ≥ 0 iff x ∈ [a,b] we have to
show:
• sufficiency: if x ∈ [a,b] then (x, f1(x), f2(x), f3(x))≥ 0 and
• necessity: if x< a or x> b then (x, f1(x), f2(x), f3(x))≥ 0 is not satisfied.
a) Assume A1), A2) and take the case R > fp·q i.e. R · p · q> f
i. Sufficiency: by eq. (11b) n(τ) = f ·(w−τ)q·w·p and by eq. (11c) s(τ) =
d·(w−τ)
p and they are both non-negative for 0≤ τ≤w. Furthermore
R · p · q > f ⇒ R · p · q ·w− f · (w−τ)> 0 for any τ ∈ [0,w]; hence by
eq. (11a) we have b(0) = 0 and db(τ)dτ = p·q·(R·p·q− f )·w
2
(R·p·q·w− f ·(w−τ))2 > 0 so that
also b(τ)≥ 0 for 0≤ τ≤w i.e. R1) is satisfied.
Necessity: τ< 0 must be ruled out by the first condition in R1) and
τ>w implies negative values for n(τ) and s(τ) (see eqs. (11b) and
(11c)) so that R1) would not be satisfied.
Finally simple substitution in eq. (11a) shows that the value of
b(τ) at the upper bound of the relevant interval is b(w)= wR .
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ii. Sufficiency: w ≥ R · b and w ≥ R · b entails w > fp·q · b ⇒ p · q ·w−
b · f > 0. It follows that (α) in eq. (12a) τ(b) = b·w·(R·p·q− f )p·q·w−b· f ≥ 0,
(β) in eq. (12b) n(b) = f ·(w−R·b)p·q·w−b· f ≥ 0 and (γ) in eq. (12c) s(b) =
d·q·w·(w−R·b)
p·q·w−b· f ≥ 0 since in all three cases the denominator is positive
and the numerator is non negative. Hence R2) is satisfied.
Necessity: b < 0 is incompatible with the first condition in R2);
b> wR , i.e. b ·R >w, is incompatible with the non negativity of n(b)
and s(b) since the numerators in both eqs. (12b) and (12c) would
be negative in face of a positive denominator.
Finally simple substitution in eq. (12a) shows that the value of
τ(b) at the upper bound of the relevant interval is τ
(w
R
)=w.
b) Now assume A1), A2) and take the case R = fp·q , i.e. R · p · q= f .
i. Sufficiency: by eq. (11b) n(τ) = f ·(w−τ)p·q·w and by eq. (11c) s(τ) =
d·(w−τ)
p and they are both non-negative for 0 ≤ τ ≤ w. Further-
more, by eq. (11a) and the fact that R = fp·q , we have b(τ) =
p·q·w·τ
R·p·q·w− f ·(w−τ) = p·q·w·τp·q·(R·w− fp·q ·(w−τ)) = w·τR·w−R·(w−τ) = w·τR·τ = wR for any
τ so that b(τ)≥ 0 as well for 0≤ τ≤w and R1) is satisfied.
Necessity: τ< 0 must be ruled out by the first condition in R1) and
τ>w implies negative values for n(τ) and s(τ) (see eqs. (11b) and
(11c)) so that R1) would not be satisfied.
By point (i) above b(τ)= wR > 0 for any τ ∈ [0,w].
ii. Sufficiency: since in this case R · p · q− f = 0, we have (α) τ(b) =
b·w·(R·p·q− f )
p·q·w−b· f = b·w·(R·p·q− f )p·q·(w−b· fp·q ) =
b·w·(R·p·q− f )
p·q·(w−b·R) = 0 for any b≥ 0; (β) n(b)=
f ·(w−R·b)
p·q·w−b· f = f ·(w−R·b)p·q·(w−b·R) = fp·q > 0 for any b≥ 0; (γ) s(b)= d·q·w·(w−R·b)p·q·w−b· f =
d·q·w·(w−R·b)
p·q·(w−b·R) = d·wp > 0 for any b≥ 0. Hence R2) is satisfied.
Necessity: b < 0 is incompatible with the first condition in R2);
τ(b), n(b) and s(b) are independent of b when R = fp·q and non
negative, so that R2) holds for any non-negative value of b.
c) Finally assume A1), A2) and R < fp·q .
i. Sufficiency: R < fp·q , i.e. f > R · p · q, and A1)-A2) entail w >
( f−R·p·q)
f ·w > 0. Then by eq. (11b) n(τ) = f ·(w−τ)p·q·w and by eq. (11c)
s(τ)= d·(w−τ)p and they are both non-negative for ( f−R·p·q)·wf ≤ τ≤w.
As to b(τ) observe that b(w)= wR and db(τ)dτ = p·q·(R·p·q− f )·w
2
(R·p·q·w− f ·(w−τ))2 < 0 so
that b(τ)≥ wR > 0 for ( f−R·p·q)·wf ≤ τ≤w. Hence R1) is satisfied.
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Necessity: τ< 0 must be ruled out by the first condition in R1) and
τ>w implies negative values for n(τ) and s(τ) (see eqs. (11b) and
(11c)) so that R1) would not be satisfied.
ii. Sufficiency: simple substitutions into eq. (12a) show that τ
(w
R
) =
w, limb→∞τ(b) = ( f−R·p·q)·wf > 0 and dτ(b)db = p·q·(R·p·q− f )·w
2
(p·q·w−b· f )2 < 0 so
that 0< ( f−R·p·q)·wf ≤ τ(b)≤w for any b ≥ wR . Consequently ∀b ≥ 0
n(b) ≥ 0 (by (12b)) and s(b) ≥ 0 (by (12c)) as in R2), so that b ≥ wR
is indeed sufficient for all relations to be non-negative.
Necessity: to show necessity we have to show that for b < wR some
of the relations become negative. Indeed, as we have shown above,
τ(b) is monotonically decreasing in b and τ
(w
R
)=w so that τ(b)>w
for b< wR implying n(b)< 0; hence b< wR is necessary for R2).
This completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 1. In the case of a constant lump sum tax policy, in equi-
librium we have R− n(τ) = τb(τ) = R·p·q·w− f ·(w−τ)p·q·w . Suppose R > fp·q ; then R1)
requires 0 ≤ τ ≤ w (see the proof of Proposition 1a)i.) and the numerator
is positive so that R − n(τ) > 0. Suppose now R < fp·q ; then R1) requires
w≥ τ≥ ( f−R·p·q)·wf > 0 (see the proof of Proposition 1c)i.) and it is easy to ver-
ify that the numerator is positive at the upper bound of variation (τ=w) and
vanishes at the lower bound τ= ( f−R·p·q)·wf , so that R−n(τ)≥ 0.
In the case of a debt stabilizing lump sum tax policy the proof is at all
similar and is not repeated here for the sake of brevity.
Proof of Lemma 1. First we show that R−n(τ)≷ R·τw ⇔R≷ fp·q . Substituting
n(τ) from (11b) into the definition of the golden rule gap we have
R−n(τ)=R− f · (w−τ)
p · q ·w =R ·
[
1− fp·q
R
· w−τ
w
]
Notice that fp·q
R
≶ 1⇔R≷ fp·q and hence
R−n(τ)=R ·
[
1− fp·q
R
· w−τ
w
]
≷R ·
[
1− w−τ
w
]
= R ·τ
w
⇔R≷ f
p · q (13)
Now we show that ητ (R−n(τ)) ≶ 1 ⇔ R ≷ fp·q . By definition ητ (R−n(τ)) =
∂(R−n(τ))
∂τ
· τR−n(τ) ; by (11b) we have (a) ∂(R−n(τ))∂τ = fp·q·w and by (13) we have (b)
τ
R−n(τ) ≶
τ
R·τ
w
= wR ⇔R≷ fp·q . Combining (a) and (b) we get
ητ (R−n(τ))≶ fp · q ·w ·
w
R
= f
p · q ·
1
R
⇔R≷ f
p · q
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Notice that if R > fp·q then fp·q · 1R < 1 and hence ητ (R−n(τ)) < fp·q · 1R < 1.
If instead R < fp·q then fp·q · 1R > 1 and hence ητ (R−n(τ)) > fp·q · 1R > 1 thus
proving the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 2. The two cases are examined separately. The first deals
with system (11) in which b(τ)= τR−n(τ) . Simple differentiation gets
∂b(τ)
∂τ
=
∂ τR−n(τ)
∂τ
= (R−n(τ))+τ ·
∂n(τ)
∂τ
(R−n(τ))2
= 1
R−n(τ) ·
(
1+ τ
R−n(τ) ·
∂n(τ)
∂τ
)
= 1
R−n(τ) ·
(
1−ητ (R−n(τ))
)
Since R−n(τ)≥ 0 by Corollary 1, the sign of ∂b(τ)
∂τ
is the sign of
(
1−ητ(R−n(τ))
)
and by Lemma 1 we have ∂b(τ)
∂τ
≷ 0⇔R≷ fp·q .
The second statement follows immediately by the fact that the functions
τ(b) and b(τ) are one the inverse of the other so that dτ(b)db ≷ 0⇔R≷ fp·q .
B Fertility and changes in income
From eq. (10b) fertility choices are governed by the relation n= f ·(w−τ)q·w·p which
shows the twofold dependency of n on w: directly (at the numerator) reflect-
ing individual positive attitude toward spending out of income for child rear-
ing and indirectly (at the denominator) where the term q ·w stands for the
cost of child rearing, so that an increase in w ends up in a higher cost. The
effect of a change in w on the choice of n can be analysed through the Slutsky
equation
∂n
∂w
=
(
∂n
∂w
)SE
−
(
∂n
∂w
·n
)IE
= − f
2 · (w−τ)− f ·τ · p
q · p2 ·w2 −
(
− f
2 · (w−τ)
q · p2 ·w2
)
= 0+ f ·τ · p
q · p2 ·w2
As it can be expected given the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function, in
absence of taxation (τ = 0) the substitution and the income effect cancel out
and ∂n
∂w = 0. If τ 6= 0, then the income effect prevails by that part directly
linked to taxation and we have
∂n
∂w
= f ·τ
q · p ·w2 R 0⇔ τR 0.
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C Derivation of formulas for comparative statics
∂b(τ)
∂w = f ·p·q·τ
2(
w·p·q·
(
f
p·q−R
)
− f ·τ
)2 ≥ 0 By A1) and A2)
∂n(τ)
∂w = f ·τp·q·w2 ≥ 0 By A1), A2) and R1)
∂s(τ)
∂w = dp > 0 By A2)
∂τ(b)
∂w =−
b2· f ·p·q·
(
R− fp·q
)
(b· f−p·q·w)2
{
≤ 0 if R > fp·q
≥ 0 if R < fp·q
By A1) and A2)
∂n(b)
∂w =
b· f ·p·q·
(
R− fp·q
)
(b· f−p·q·w)2
{
≥ 0 if R > fp·q
≤ 0 if R < fp·q
By A1), A2) and R2)
∂s(b)
∂w

> 0 if R > fp·q
≤ 0 if R < fp·q and b ∈
[
w
R ,
w
R ·
(
1+
√
R· f
p·q −1
)]
> 0 if R < fp·q and b> wR ·
(
1+
√
R· f
p·q −1
) See Proof 1 below
∂b(τ)
∂R = p
2·q2·w2·τ
(R·p·q·w− f ·(w−τ))2 ≥ 0 By R1)
∂n(τ)
∂R = 0 By eq. (11b)
∂s(τ)
∂R = 0 By eq. (11c)
∂τ(b)
dR = b·p·q·wp·q·w−b· f
{
≥ 0 if R > fp·q
≤ 0 if R < fp·q
See Proof 2 below
∂n(b)
∂R = b· fb· f−p·q·w
{
≤ 0 if R > fp·q
≥ 0 if R < fp·q
See Proof 2 below
∂s(b)
dR = b·p·q·wb· f−p·q·w
{
≤ 0 if R > fp·q
≥ 0 if R < fp·q
See Proof 2 below
∂b(τ)
∂q =− f ·p·τ·w·(w−τ)(R·p·q·w− f ·(w−τ))2 ≥ 0
By A1), A2) and
Proposition 1
∂n(τ)
∂q =− f ·(w−τ)p·q2·w ≤ 0
By A1), A2) and
Proposition 1
∂s(τ)
∂q = 0 By eq. (11c)
∂τ(b)
∂q = b· f ·p·w·(w−R·b)(b· f−p·q·w)2
{
≥ 0 if R > fp·q
≤ 0 if R < fp·q
By A1), A2) and
Proposition 1
∂n(b)
∂q =− f ·p·w·(w−R·b)(b· f−p·q·w)2
{
≤ 0 if R > fp·q
≥ 0 if R < fp·q
By A1), A2) and
Proposition 1
∂s(b)
∂q =− b·d· f ·w·(w−R·b)(b· f−p·q·w)2
{
≤ 0 if R > fp·q
≥ 0 if R < fp·q
By A1), A2) and
Proposition 1
Proof 1. Differentiating s(b) in eq. (12c) with respect to w gets
∂s(b)
∂w
= d · p · q2 ·
w2+ f ·bp·q · (R ·b−2 ·w)
(b · f − p · q ·w)2 (14)
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Assume A1) and A2) and examine (14) separately in the two regimes.
• R > fp·q which, by Proposition 1, entails 0≤ b≤ wR . Then
∂s(b)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
b=0
= d
p
> 0
∂s(b)
∂w
∣∣∣∣
b= wR
= R · p · q
R · p · q− f > 0
∂∂s(b)
∂w
∂b
= 2 ·b ·d · f · q ·w · ( f −R · p · q)
(b · f − p · q ·w)3 > 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that in this regime the
numerator is negative and the denominator is negative as well since
w≥R ·b and R > fp·q entail w> fp·q ·b i.e. p · q ·w> b · f . Therefore ∂s(b)∂w
is monotonically increasing from 0 < dp < 1 to R·p·qR·p·q− f > 1 for b in the
interval
[
0, wR
]
.
• R < fp·q which, by Proposition 1, entails b> wR . Then in this case
lim
b→ wR
∂s(b)
∂w
= R · p · q
R · p · q− f < 0
lim
b→∞
∂s(b)
∂w
= R ·d · q
f
> 0
∂∂s(b)
∂w
∂b
= 2 ·b ·d · f · q ·w · ( f −R · p · q)
(b · f − p · q ·w)3 > 0
where the last inequality follows from the fact that in this regime both
the numerator and the denominator are positive. Therefore ∂s(b)
∂w is
monotonically increasing from R·p·qR·p·q− f < 0, when b tends to its min-
imum value in this regime, to R·d·qf > 0 when b becomes arbitrarily
high and vanishes when b = wR ·
(
1+
√
R· f
p·q −1
)
as simple calculations
can show.
Proof 2. Assuming A1), A1) and R2), the sign of b·p·q·wp·q·w−b· f is the sign of the
denominator and in the two regimes we have:
• R > fp·q entails b ≥ wR or w≥R · b. Hence w≥R · b and R > fp·q together
entail w> fp·q ·b i.e. p · q ·w> b · f .
• R < fp·q entails b > wR or w < R·b. Hence w < R · b and R < fp·q together
entail w< fp·q ·b i.e. p · q ·w< b · f .
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